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The Dartmouth College case' established that a state may make a
contract, which will, by force of the federal Constitution,2 be pro-
tected against impairment. But such a contract may deal with matters
which are within the field of the state's governmental powers. The
courts, and particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, have
frequently had to determine whether a contract dealing with such
matters, prevents the state's subsequent exercise of the governmental
powers insofar as such exercise may affect the rights and duties
arising from the contract in question. In other words, how far may
a state make a contract protected from impairment by the federal
Constitution, by which it surrenders its governmental powers?
In New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company it
appeared that an exclusive franchise for a period of years had been
granted by the state for the vending of gas in New Orleans, and that
after such grant an amendment had been added to the state constitu-
tion abolishing all monopolies. It was claimed that a state legislature
can not -by contract prevent the subsequent exercise by the state of
its police power; that the adoption of this constitutional amendment
was "the exercise of the police power, and that such amendment was,
therefore, effective notwithstanding the franchise contract. The
court said that "police power" is a very broad term and may include
1Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (I8ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 518.
"No State shall . . . pass any . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." Art. I, sec. io.
(1885) 115 U. S. 65o, 6 Sup. Ct. 252.
4' [589]
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substantially all governmental activities. But the court had no doubt
that the state may by contract restrict the exercise of some of its
powers-that it is not correct to say that a state may not by contract
restrict the exercise of its police power, when the term is used in its
broadest sense. Applying these conclusions to the case in hand, the
court held that the grant of the exclusive franchise was protected by
the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contractual
obligations, and to that extent restricted the state in the exercise of
goyernmental powers, even by constitutional amendment.
4  The court
also pointed to the well established doctrine that a state may by con-
tract limit its governmental power of taxation.
5 But the court clearly
recognized bounds to the power of one legislature to limit the discre-
tion of its successors, declaring that they may not be so limited in the
enactment of laws necessary to the protection of public health and
morals.6
In line with the suggestions just referred to, a series of cases in
the Supreme Court of the United States makes it clear that certain
governmental powers cannot be affected by contracts entered into by
the state, and that contracts which attempt to abridge such powers
are to that extent void, and, therefore, not within the protection of the
federal Constitution against the impairment of contractual obligations.
A state may provide for the suppression of nuisances, or pass other
legislation in the interest of public health, even though this will
infringe franchise privileges and rights.
7 Franchises for the manu-
facture of alcoholic beverages, or for the conduct of lotteries, do not
prevent later legislation, which may be justified as protective of public
morals.8 Legislation requiring railroads to carry their tracks over or
under highways, 9 or to go to other expense or inconvenience for the
safety of the public, is not unconstitutional, though immunity from
such legislation may have been contracted for.'
0
It is clear, then, that a state cannot make a contract so as to limit
the exercise of its police power for the protection of the "peace, good
order, health or morals of its inhabitants.""
' But in the case in which
'The earlier cases of Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. (1863, U. S.)
i Wall. 116, and the Binghamton Bridge (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 51, were relied
upon.
'New Jersey v. Wilson (1812, IU. S.) 7 Cranch, 164; Asylum v. New Orleans
(188i) 105 U. S. 362.
'New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., supra, 669.
'Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1878) 97 U. S. 659; Butchers' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co. (1883) fiI U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652.
'Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (1877) 97 U. S. 25; Stone v. Mississippi (1879)
ioI U. S. 814; and see COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 437.
"Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Nebraska (1898) 170 U. S. 57, 18 Sup. Ct. 513;
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Duluth (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. 583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341.
"Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Goldsboro (914) 232 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 364.
" Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. (1898) 172 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77.
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this declaration was made it was decided that a term in the franchise
contract of a water company, that no water works would be con-
structed by the city, was protected -by the federal Constitution, and
would exclude the exercise of the governmental power to construct
such water works. The court said that
"where a contract for a supply of water is innocuous in itself and is
carried out with due regard to the good order of the city and the health
of its inhabitants, the aid of the police power cannot be invoked to
abrogate or impair it.'
12
The legislative power to fix rates of public utilities is recognized
as part of the police power, being the power to enforce the liability
which rests upon public utilities to serve at reasonable rates.13 This
is a power distinctly for the protection of the public, and affecting
vitally their welfare. Yet the Supreme Court has declared that the
state may contract away this power for a fixed period, and may
authorize a municipal corporation to do so. 14 The question as to what
governmental powers can be abdicated by contract, even temporarily,
is, of course, merely a question of public policy, where it is not
controlled by the provisions of state constitutions. It is a question
of what powers need to be so continually available that public policy
imperatively forbids their abdication by contract. In view of the
continual necessity and constant practice of governmental regulation
of rates, it seems regrettable that the Supreme Court of the United
States gave currency to the doctrine that a state may contract away
this power of regulation. And in fact we see now a very decided
tendency to limit this doctrine.
Most of the cases in which the state has attempted to abrogate
contract rates over the objection of the public utility,15 have been
cases in which the contract was made, not between the utility and the
state legislature, but between the utility and the municipality. 8 In
SIbid., 17.
Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 13; Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota
(1915) 236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429.
"'Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport (igoi) 1So U. S. 587, 21 Sup. Ct. 493;
Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Ry. (i9o2) 184 U. S. 368, 22 Sup. Ct. 410; Cleve-
land v. Cleveland City Ry. (i9o4) 194 U. S. 517, 24 Sup. Ct. 756; Vicksburg v.
Vicksburg Waterworks Co. (1907) 206 U. S. 496, 27 Sup. Ct. 762.
"5We shall come later to the-abrogation of contract rates over the objection
of the municipality.
"6There is, of course, a third possibility, namely, a contract between the
utility and a private person purporting to fix rates. Because of the common-law
duty to serve at reasonable rates resting upon public utilities, and the authority
of the state to control the performance of that duty under its police power,
courts do not hesitate to hold that such contracts are made subject to the
police power, and that legislation which impairs the obligations of such con-
tracts is, therefore, not unconstitutional, whether such a contract be with a
consumer. Leiper v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Ry. (i918) 262 Pa. 328, io5 Ad.
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such cases it is necessary to determine whether the municipality has
power to make such a contract. The Supreme Court of the United
States has declared that a municipality not only has no inherent or
implied power either to regulate rates or to contract away the state's
power of rate regulation, but that the delegation of authority to the
municipality to make such a contract must be perfectly clear.
17  In
some cases the power to contract as to rates has been found clearly
vested in the municipality, and the utility has, therefore, been protected
in its contract rates ;"' but in others that clear power has not been
found, and the contract has, therefore, been held to be no protection
against the exercise of the police power in the form of rate regula-
tion."' An examination of these cases makes two things clear. The
first is that there is a strong presumption against the abrogation by
contract of governmental powers over rates, and a consequent strong
presumption against the delegation by the state to the municipality
of the authority to abrogate such powers by contract.2
0 The second
is that, although when a case is presented to the Supreme Court of
the United States under the contract clause of the Constitution, it
will itself determine whether there is a contract, as well as whether
there has been a breach of it; that Court, nevertheless, in determining
whether there is a contract, will give much weight to decisions of the
highest court of the state on the question whether the statutes of the
states do in fact delegate to the municipality power to contract as to
rates. A most striking example of this policy is found in Freeport
Water Company v. Freeport,21 where the majority of the court, fol-
lowing the interpretation put upon the state statute by the Illinois
court, held that there had been no delegation. Also in the case of
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Company,22 the Supreme Court
551; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation (igig) 248
U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117; or with a vendor, Portland Ry. v. Railroad Com-
mission (1913) 229 U. S. 397, 412, 33 Sup. Ct. 820.
'Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, supra; "Detroit v. Detroit Cit. Ry., supra;
Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry., supra; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks
Co., supra; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles (19o8) 211 U. S. 265, 29 Sup.
Ct 5o; Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds (917) 244 U. S. 574, 37 Sup. Ct.
705; City of Englewood v. Denver & S. P. Co. (19g) 248 U. S. 294, 39 Sup. Ct.
I00.
is Detroit v. Detroit Citizens Ry., supra; Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry.,
supra; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., supra; Detroit United Ry. v.
Michigan (1916) 242 U. S. 238, 37 Sup. Ct. 87.
"Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, supra; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles,
supra; Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Railroad Commission (91) 238 U. S. 174,
35 Sup. Ct. 820; Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, supra; City of Engle-
wood v. Denver & S. P. Ry., supra.
' See cases in notes 18 and ig, supra.
2 Supra.
' Supra. Similarly in Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Railroad Commission, supra,
careful consideration was given to decisions of the state court.
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examined with care the Mississippi cases in which the state court had
interpreted the statutes of that state, and followed its interpretation
to the effect that there had been legislative delegation of authority to
make rate contracts with utilities.
23
Granted a binding contract as to rates made between municipality
and utility, still a mere breach of the provisions of such a contract
will not give the federal courts jurisdiction-there must be legislation
impairing the contract obligations. So a municipal ordinance declaring
an intention not to be bound by a rate contract, and not to perform it,
does not raise a federal question.24 But an attempt by ordinance or
statute to change the rights and duties under a valid rate contract,
constitutes legislation impairing the obligation of a contract, and the
claim that legislation has that effect does raise a federal question. 25
As already pointed out, it may also 'be true that there is express
authority to a municipality to make a certain contract with a utility
company, and yet that such contract does not prevent subsequent legis-
lation which clearly impairs the obligations of the contract. This
is the case if the contract attempts to exclude the state from the
exercise of such governmental powers as have been declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States to be inalienable-namely, its
police power for the protection of the "peace, good order, health and
morals of its inhabitants."2  This would be equally true of a rate
contract if the constitution of the state expressly f6rbade the state
to contract away its power to regulate rates.2' But there are some
=' State courts have not infrequently implied such delegation of authority from
constitutional or statutory provisions that a public utility may only have the
privilege to enter a municipality with the latter's consent. Matter of Quinby v.
Public Service Commission (1918) 223 N. Y. 244, 11g N. E. 433; Salt Lake City
v. Utah Light Co. (1918, Utah) 173 Pac. 556; St. Louis v. Public Service Corn-
mission (1918, Mo.) 207 S. W. 799; or from a charter power to grant franchises.
Portland v. Public Service Commission (1918, Ore.) 173 Pac. 1178. But other
courts have required clearer evidence of an intention to delegate such authority.
See, for instance, the decisions of the state courts reviewed in Freeport Water
Co. v. Freeport, supra, and Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Wisconsin Railroad Corn-
mission, supra. The position is taken in some cases that while the state may
apparently delegate to a municipality authority to contract away its power to
regulate rates, authority to permit and regulate the use of streets is not a
grant of authority to contract away the rate-regulating power, though it is a
grant of authority to contract as to rates subject to the state's police power.
Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Railroad Commission (913) 153 Wis. 592, 142 X. W.
491.; Travers City v. Michigan Railroad Commission (1918, Mich.) 168 N. W.
481; State ex rel. Billings v. Billings Gas Co. (1918, Mont.) 173 Pac. 799;
Winfield v. Public Service Commission (r918, Ind.) iI8 N. E. 531.
'St. Paul Gas Light Co. v. St. Paul (igoi) 181 U. S, 142, 21 Sup. Ct. 575;
City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving Fund Co. (igo5) 197 U. S. 178, 25
Sup. Ct. 42o.
' The distinction is well explained in Northern Pacific Ry. v. Duluth, supra.
"6 See notes 7 to li, supra.
'Detroit v. Detroit Citizens Ry. supra, 382. The Oklahoma constitution pro-
vides in part: "Nor shall the power to regulate the charges for public service be
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states in which the highest courts have declared, Without the aid of
express constitutional provision, that it is unconstitutional for the
legislature, itself or through the agency of a municipality, to contract
away the power of rate regulation-that such power is as necessary,
and, therefore, as inalienable, as the power to protect the physical and
moral well-being of its inhabitants. 28 If in such a state the legislature
made a rate contract with a public utility company, and later fixed
lower rates by statute, would the Supreme Court of the United States
hold such later legislation an unconstitutional impairment of the rate
contract? Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the majority of the
court in Freeport Water Company v. Freeport, after stating that a
state may contract away its power to regulate rates for a fixed period,
said:
"We do not mean to say that if it was the declared policy of the
State that the power of alienation of a governmental function did not
exist, a subsequently asserted contract would not be controlled by
such policy.
'129
'Such a policy as to rate regulation had been intimated, he said, but
not asserted in the decisions of the state court, and was not relied upon
in the case under consideration.
But further, in the case of Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v.
Tranbarger,° we seem to find a distinct change of emphasis with
regard to the capacity of states to limit the exercise of their govern-
surrendered." Art. 18, sec. 7. Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co. (igg) 250 U.
S. 393, 39 Sup. Ct. 526. The Missouri constitution provides that, "The exercise
of fhe police power of the State shall never be abridged, or so construed as to
permit corporations to conduct their business in such a manner as to infringe
the equal rights of individuals, or the general well-being of the State." Art. 12,
see. 5. The Supreme Court of Missouri has declared that '.'Under such a con-
stitutional restriction, the Legislature would be powerless to enact a valid law
by the terms of which the right of the state in the exercise of its sovereign police
power in the fixing of reasonable rates for public services could be limited or
abridged." State ex rel. Sedalia v. Public Service Commission (I9x8, Mo.)
2o4 S. W. 497, 499. The Pennsylvania constitution contains the same provision.
Art. I6, sec. 3. The Pennsylvania public service commission held that the con-
stitutional provision *against impairment of contracts does not prevent regulation
of contractual rates under the police power. Wilkinsburg v. Pittsburg Rys.
(1918) P. U. R. i9i8F I3I; and see Leiper v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Ry.,
supra, 332.
."City of Tampa v. Tampa Water Works (19o3) 45 Fla. 6oo, 34 So. 631;
Portland v. Public Service Commission, supra; Salt, Lake City v. Utah Light Co.,
supra; Georgia Ry. & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1919, Ga.) 98 S. E. 696;
Memphis v. Enloe (igg, Tenn.) 214 S. W. 7I; City of Chicago z. O'Connell
(1917) 278 Ill. 591, 6o7, i16 N. E. 21o. And see Sandpoint Water & Light Co.
v. City of Sandpoint (1918, Ida.) 173 Pac. 972.
Supra, 593.
(1915) 238 U. S. 67, 35 Sup. Ct. 678.
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mental powers by contract. A statute of Missouri passed in 1907
required railroads to make suitable openings in embankments on their
"rights of way" for water drainage. The company in question had
constructed its embankment long before the passage of this statute,
and the company contended that the statute impaired its rights secured
from the charter contract, and took its property without due process.
After consideration of other points, the court said:
"But a more satisfactory answer to the argument under the contract
clause, and one which at the same time refutes the contention of
plaintiff in error under the due process clause, is that the statute in
question was passed under the police power of the State for the general
benefit of the community at large and for the purpose of preventing
unnecessary and wide-spread injury to property.
"It is established by repeated decisions of this court that neither of
these provisions of the Federal Constitution has the effect of over-
riding the power of the State to establish all regulations reasonably
necessary to secure the health, safety, or general welfare of the com-
munity; that this power can-neither be abdicated nor bargained away,
and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and
property rights are held subject to its' fair exercise. Atlantic Coast
Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558, and cases cited. And it is also
settled that the police power embraces regulations designed to promote
the public convenience or the general welfare and prosperity, as well
as those in the interest of public health, morals, or safety ...
"We deem it very clear that the act under consideration is a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power, and not in any proper sense a taking
of the property of plaintiff in error.
3 1
Clearly we have here a change of emphasis. It seems now that it is
not only the power to protect the safety, health and morals of its
inhabitants which the state cannot abdicate; "the power of the state
to establish all regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety and general welfare of the community . . . is inalienable
even by express grant." If the power to protect land from being
flooded is so necessary for the "general welfare of the community"
that it cannot be abridged even by express grant, what should we say
at the present time with regard to the power to regulate rates of public
utilities? Is it not more necessary for the purpose of securing the
"general welfare" of the community that the state should have the
inalienable power to protect its inhabitants from unreasonable and
discriminating rates for transportation, water, gas, electricity and
sewerage facilities, than it is that it should have such an inalienable
power to protect the land of its inhabitants from being flooded because
of the use made of their lands by others? Possibly the doctrine that
a state may contract away its power to regulate public utility rates
is not yet too firmly fixed in the adjudications of the Supreme Court
to be shaken by well-directed argument.
"Ilbid., 76-77.
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Since 1914 we have seen a most interesting reversal of parties in
efforts to get away from contract rates. Due to the vast increase in
the cost of service, public utilities all over the country have been urging
the necessity of legislation increasing their charges to the public; and
frequently they have been opposed by municipalities, claiming that
rates have been fixed by franchise contracts, and that any legislative
change would constitute an unconstitutional impairment of the
contractual obligations.
If it were held that the state cannot restrict the exercise of its police
power to regulate rates by contract with public utilities, the difficulty
would disappear in this class of cases, as well as in the class where it
is the utility which seeks to prevent the alteration of contract rates,
which we have just discussed. In fact, as is pointed out above, 2 in
several states it is expressly declared, or judicially held, to be uncon-
stitutional to contract away the rate-making power, with the result
that the impairment of such contract does not contravene the federal
Constitution. Nevertheless, we must still, in most jurisdictions, assume
that the state can make a rate contract with a public utility which is
protected by the federal Constitution from impairment; and that, if
clearly authorized to do so, a municipality may make such a contract
on behalf of the state."3
Here, then, the first question is, granted a contract has been made
between the municipality and the utility, which is within the protection
of the federal Constitution, may the municipality invoke the constitu-
tional guaranty against threatened impairment by the state? The
answer to that question will be found in the answer to the further one,
has the state made any contract with the municipality abdicating its
police power, or has the state simply made such a contract through the
municipality as its agent, with the utility? If the only contract is
between the state and the utility, and the state and the utility agree to
rescind it, clearly no contractual obligation has been impaired.
Fortunately the same question which arises when the state at the
request of the utility raises franchise rates, was presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States before the war in Worcester v.
' Notes 27 and 28, supra.
"In at least two recent cases in the federal courts public utility companies,
finding their franchise rates inadequate, have attempted to get relief from them
in equity, Knoxville Gas Co. v. Knoxville (I918, E. D. Tenn.) 253 Fed. 217;
Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. Columbus (I918, S. D. Ohio) 253 Fed. 499,
affirmed in (1919) 249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349, (1919) 28 YALF LAW JOURNAL,
826-827. In each case it was found that the city was within its delegated
powers in making the ordinance, that the ordinance and its acceptance constituted
a valid contract, and that the court of equity had no power to set it aside in
absence of fraud or duress. This is, of course, to be distinguished from an
appeal for equitable relief from statutory rates. Municipal Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission (1gig) 225 N. Y. 89, i2i'N. E. 772, (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 592.
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Street Railway Company.34 A Massachusetts statute provided that
a street railway wishing permission to enter a municipality should
apply to the municipal authorities for the location of its tracks, and
that such a privilege might be granted under such restrictions as
seemed in the interest of the public. The city granted this privilege
in certain locations under condition that the company should lay and
keep up a certain part of the pavement, and this grant was accepted
and acted upon. Several years later a state statute was passed pro-
viding that street railways should not be required to keep pavements
in repair. The proceedings which reached the Supreme Court were
to enforce the duty to repair according to the grants made, it being
contended that the grants constituted contracts protected by the federal
Constitution. Admitting for argument that the grants were contracts,
and that the company's rights and privileges could not be impaired
without its consent, the Court held that since the restrictions were of
a public and governmental nature, the legislature would have all the
power to terminate them that the city itself would have, since the city
is but a creature of the state for governmental purposes.
This last year the Circuit Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit
applied these principles to the rate case of Salem v. Salem Water,
Light & Power Company,3 5 expressing them even more clearly than
the Supreme Court had done. The city was incorporated under a
charter by which it had authority to provide for water and lighting,
or to grant the privilege to use the streets for these purposes "upon
such terms and conditions as the council may prescribe." The council
fixed a maximum hydrant rate, which was later increased by the public
service commission. The court declared that the charter and powers
granted to a municipality do not constitute a contract between the
municipality and the state protected by the Constitution." In making
a contract as to rates to be charged the public, a municipality acts
merely as agent for the state, and with the consent of the company
the contract may be changed by the state. In other words, the grant
to the municipality of power to contract as to rates, is not itself a con-
tract between the municipality and the state protected by the federal
Constitution, but is merely a delegation of a certain power by the
legislature to a political subdivision of the state, which may be revoked
at any time; and any rate contract which a municipality has authority
to make is in fact a contract between the state on the one hand, acting
through its agent, the municipality, and the utility on the other hand,
which can not be said to be "impaired" when in fact it is modified
"(10o5) 196 U. S. 539, 25 Sup. Ct. 327. And see the earlier case of New
Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. (i8gi) 142 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 142.
' (igig, C. C. A. 9th) 255 Fed. 295; and see Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co.,
supra.
'Hunter v. Pittsburgh (i9o7) 207 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40; Pawhuska v.
Pawhuska Oil Co., supra.
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by the actual consent of both parties. These principles have been
recognized and acted upon by the state courts in controversies pre-
cipitated by the raising of franchise rates.3 7 As said by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, if the ordinance be viewed as a contract,
it is well settled that a municipal corporation, an agency of the state,
is not protected ,by the contract clause of the Constitution against its
own creator, the state.
3 8
Still, it would be possible for municipalities to be given power
by the state constitution to make rate contracts which would be beyond
the power of the legislature and the utility to alter even by mutual
agreement. A number of our state constitutions provide that a street
railway may not be constructed or operated within a municipality
except with the consent of the local authorities. It has been claimed
that this gives municipalities constitutional authority to contract as to
rates as a condition of consent, and that such contract 'being authorized
by the constitution is safe from legislative control. This claim has,
however, been held to be unsound by the state courts of last resort
to which it has been presented.3 9 It is clear that under such constitu-
tional provisions municipalities have the absolute power to choose
whether to exclude street railways or to admit them, and it is conceded
that such power carries with it the power to consent only upon the
conclusion of a contract incorporating conditions laid down by the
municipality. But it is denied that there is here more than an authori-
zation to contract on behalf of the state, leaving as the contracting
parties the state and the utility, and leaving such parties the power,
therefore, to change the terms of the contract by mutual consent. In
the Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Comnmlission,40 the New York
court did not pass upon the question, and left it uncertain whether it
would take the view just set forth, if the question were brought before
it for decision.
'Arlington v. Bay State Ry. (1916) 224 Mass. 463, 113 N. E. 273; Portland
v. Public Service Commission, supra; Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. City of
Sandpoint, supra; Robertson v. Wilmington & P. Traction Co. (1918, Del.) 104
Atl. 839. See notes on decisions of state commissions, P. U. R. i9i8A 780; P.
U. R. i9i8B 622; P. U. R. i9i8F 761; P. U. R. I19iF 77. Though the power
of the state to raise such rates would seem to be denied in Interurban Ry. &
Terminal Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1918, Ohio) 120 N. E. 831.
18 Collingswood Sewerage Co. v. Collingswood (1918. N. J.) ioz At. 9oi,
affirmed (1918, N. J.) io5 Atl. .20.
ICity of Chicago v. O'Connell, supra; St. Louis v. Public Service Commission,
supra; Kansas City v. Public Service Commission (1918, Mo.) 210 S. W. 381;
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light Co., supra; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Clifton Forge (3919, Va.) 99 S. E. 723. Such a claim does not
raise a federal question. Kansas City v. Public Service Commission (9,9) 40
Sup. Ct. 54. See the citation to the case in the Missouri court just above in
this note.
(1918) 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433.
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The intimation in support of the above view is clear in International
Railway Company v. Public Service Commission;41 but the New rork
court in that case also raises, but does not answeri the question as to
what would be the result of the exercise by the legislature of its power
to raise rates which had been fixed by contract under a consent clause
of a state constitution. Its language is interesting:
"It is one thing to annul an independent covenant, which, though
part of the consideration for the grant, does not condition the grant
itself. It is another thing to annul a condition which operates, by
way of defeasance of the franchise, to terminate the grant. . . . A
municipality may be willing to have an electric railroad in its streets;
it may be unwilling to have a railroad run by steam. It may be will-
ing to have a railroad that can furnish cheap transportation; it may
be unwilling to have another. . . . The Legislature may say that,
subject to the condition subsequent annexed to the consent of the
locality there shall be a change of motive power or an increase of
the rates. It may say that if the local authorities do not promptly
manifest the election to revoke, the condition shall be waived. The
doubt is whether, going further, it may wipe out-the condition alto-
gether, and transform a consent that was qualified into one that is
absolute. . . . In deciding the Quinby Case, we left the question
open, as we leave it open now. On the one hand, it is argued
that the condition admits of no exception, since none has been
expressed . . . ; on the other, that by implication its binding force
is to continue only in default of legislation that shall cover a like field.
We assume that much may be said in favor of each view.
4 2
The question which is raised here is a very interesting one, but it
would seem fair to answer it in this way: The city might have
excluded the company. Instead it chose to let it in, offering to make
a contract on behalf of the state, and requiring the company to join
in the contract as a condition precedent to permission to enter. The
city impliedly had authority to make this contract for the state, but
like every other contract made for the state, it could be changed by
the two contracting parties, the state, through the legislature, and the
company. There is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting the exer-
cise by the legislature of this inherent power. This question which
troubles the New York court does not seem to have presented itself
as a substantial difficulty to the courts which have actually passed
upon the power of the legislature to raise rates fixed by contract
under a consent clause of a state constitution.
43
1 (i9ix) 226 N. Y. 474, 124 N. E. 123, (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 225.
'Ibid. In Village of Long Beach v. Long Beach Pr. Co. (I918) 104 Misc'.337,
it appeared that not only use of highways, but also private easements had been
granted to the company, rates for gas being fixed by the terms of the grant.
The company raised its rates with the consent of the public service commission,
and a preliminary injunction against their enforcement was granted on the
ground that the company could not retain the private easements under the con-
tract and repudiate its part of the contract as to rates.
' Cases in note 39, supra.
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Contracts made by municipalities with public utilities may deal with
rates to be charged the public, or they may deal with rates to be
charged the municipality; or they may deal with the case of public
property; or the municipality may have a proprietary interest in the
property used by the utility, the earnings from which may be affected
if the contract rates are changed. There is substantial unanimity to
the effect that the state with the consent of the utility can change
contract rates affecting the public. But in several cases where the
contract rates sought to be raised were to be paid by the municipality,
the municipality has sought to persuade the court that the legislature
could not interfere with the contract rates. In State ex rel. Sedalia
v. Public Service Commission" the question was as to the validity of
an increase made without the city's concurrence in a franchise hydrant
rate. It was held to be valid. In Sandpoint Water & Light Company
v. City of Sandpoint'5 the city attacked the validity of increases in
rates for hydrant and sprinkling service over those previously fixed
in a franchise contract. The court said that in granting a franchise
in which rates are fixed, a municipality is exercising only powers
conferred upon it, and these powers may be withdrawn at any time.
"A municipality has no vested right to the continued exercise of
such powers, nor can it obtain a vested right in any contract entered
into or property acquired through the exercise of such powers as
against the right of the state, its creator, to assume complete control
of its affairs."'"
The case of Salem v. Salem Water, Light & Power Company, already
considered,47 takes the same position with regard to hydrant rates.
In People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. Public Service
Commission,"8 the court had before it the question of raising gas
rates fixed -by franchise contract. It held that such rates could be
raised, but in the opinion there is a dictum that, if the franchise pro-
vides the rate at which the municipality is to be served, such may
constitute a contract which the legislature cannot change. To support
that dictum the court cited Kings County Lighting Company v. City
of New York.' There the claim was that a contract rate for street
lighting had been lowered by the legislature. The decision was that
the statute invoked was not intended to affect the contract rate in
question. It was declared, however, by way of dictum, that if it
had .been intended to do so, it would have been unconstitutional as
impairing the obligation of a contract; which is, as we have seen,
the view supported by the majority of cases at the present time, when
44 Supra. ,0 Ibid., 973.
43 Supra. " Supra.
"(I919) 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777.
"(i916, N. Y.) 176 App. Div. i75, affirmed (19,7) 2I N. Y. 5oo.
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an attempt is made to lower contract rates. In this connection the
court said,
"In no sense was it [the statute lowering rates for street lighting]
an exercise of the police power, as it was not for the general public,
but for the defendant's relief, standing apart from general local
consumers." 50
Notwithstanding these dicta, it is believed that the following propo-
sitions are sound. The duty to serve at reasonable rates exists
equally whether the service is rendered to the municipal corporation,
or to the inhabitants of the municipality; it follows that the police
power extends to the enforcement of that duty in each case; and
that the municipality if authorized to contract in this field of police
power as to rates for either kind of service, does so only as agent of
the state; and that the contract can, therefore, in each case be modified
by agreement between the state and the company.
The case of Worcester v. Street Railway Company, already con-
sidered,5' is instructive in this connection. The franchise under which
the company was allowed to use the streets of the city required the
company to lay and to keep up certain parts of the pavements in the
streets through which its tracks were laid. Later a Massachusetts
statute provided that street railways should not be required to keep
pavements in repair. Actions being brought to enforce the duty to
repair according to the franchise provisions, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that, granting the franchise was a binding
contract, the restrictions in it were of a public or governmental char-
acter and the state could, therefore, change its requirements without
the consent of the city. Here the contract called for the upkeep by
the company of property in which the municipality had the fee or an
easement, to the financial advantage of the municipality. Yet the
legislation was held constitutionbL-it neither unconstitutionally
impaired the obligation of the contract, nor deprived the municipality
of its property without due process.
The court in the Worcester case does say that a municipality may
own property, not of a public or governmental nature, which would
be protected by the federal Constitution from legislative action. The
only illustration given by the court of property which is excepted
from legislative control is the following:
"Property which is held by these corporations upon conditibns or
terms contained in a grant and for a special use, may not be diverted
by the legislature. '52
'Kings County Lighting Co. v. New York (I916, N. Y.) 176 App. Div. 175, 181.
,1 Supra.
'Ibid., citing Commissioners v. Lucas (1876) 93 U. S. io8, 115 (dictum);
Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston (1893) 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695; New
Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co. supra, 91 (dictum). The italics are
the present writer's.
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But this inhibition would seem to 'be based rather upon the duty to
observe the trust in favor of the public upon which the property
was granted, than upon the prohibition against impairing contractual
rights and privileges or taking property. In the field of legislative
control of municipal property the law is still in a very unsettled state,
but the following statements are reasonably safe: (i) Power granted
to a municipality may be withdrawn by the legislature at will; (2) when
it is feasible to use property acquired by the municipality for the pur-
pose for which it was acquired, the legislature may not divert the same
to some wholly different use; (3) there has been a rather persistent
attempt to distinguish between property held by a municipality for
public purposes, and for quasi-private purposes, and to claim an
immunity for the latter from state control somewhat analogous to
that enjoyed by privately owned property, while recognizing a greater
degree of state control over the former, though very satisfactory
progress has not been made in such classification; (4) all municipal
property, even of quasi-private character, is at least as subject to
control by the legislature under the police power as is private property
devoted to a public use."
If a municipality owns a public utility, there seems no reason to
doubt that the state may exercise its police power in the regulation
of the rates of such utility. This it may do under the police power
where the project is privately owned, though it reduces the income
from such property, and a fortiori should it have the power to do so
if the property is owned by one of its political subdivisions for the
benefit of the public."
Where the municipality builds and owns a public utility system,
as is the case in, New York City with the subways, and leases such
system to an operating company, contracting for a definite per cent.
of the gross or net earnings, and fixing by contract the fare which the
company may charge, it would seem to have no right to object if the
legislature, with the consent of the company, changes the rate of
fare. As we have seen above, the contract as to fare being in fact
a contract between the state and the company, the state and the com-
pany may agree as to its alteration and such alteration is not an
impairment of any contractual obligations. 1f it can be shown that
the change as to fare will lower the return which the city will receive
on its property represented by the utility system (which would gen-
erally not be true, the change being made with the consent of the
operating company), still, this could not be viewed as taking the city's
property without due process, because whatever taking there might
be would be merely the indirect result of a legitimate exercise of the
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 342 ff.; i Dillon, Municipal
Corporations (5th ed. x9iI) secs. io6ff.; ig R. C. L. 758-768; 28 Cyc. 282.
54 Dillon, op. cit., sec. Ii6.
REGULATING FRANCHISE RATES
police power. In principle the case is not different from the Worcester
case, considered above. In that case the contract made by the city
with the company, was changed, and property interests of the city
were affected, but the legislation which had these effects was held
constitutional.
Let us consider for a moment the possibility of complaint by a
patron of a public utility that the rate to be charged by the utility
has been unreasonably raised, whereby he is compelled to pay rates
that are unreasonably high. In an Indiana case,55 in which the ques-
tion before the court was the constitutionality of certain reductions
of rates, the court said:
"To allow a carrier, for the use of its road, a rate less than is
necessary to save it from actual loss in its operation, is 'to take the
property without just compensation and without due process of law;
and to require of shippers a greater charge than is reasonable, under
the circumstances, is to treat them in the same way. In either case
the act is confiscatory." 56
As to the shipper, this is mere dictum. On the other hand, in Brook-
lyn Union Gas Company v. City of New York 5 T where it was con-
tended that the legislative rate was unreasonably high, the court
declared that there is no property right in a rule of law and that it is,
therefore, not unconstitutional for the legislature to take away the
advantage of the rule of law that a public utility must serve at a
reasonable rate. When the company is allowed to charge more than
reasonable rates, a patron's money is not thereby taken-his patronage
is v6luntary and he is not forced to part with -his money.58
Generally at the present time legislatures do not act directly in
lowering or raising rates, but act through public service commissions.
That they may delegate such power, if they lay down general principles
for the guidance of the commissions, is now axioma'tic.59 Such
authority generally extends to the changing of preexisting legislative
Southern Indiana Ry. v. Railroad Commission (i9o9) 172 Ind. 113, 87 N. E.
966.
Ibid., 128.
(i9o6) 5o Misc. 450, affirmed (igo6) 115 App. Div. 69, and (i907) 188 N. Y.
334, 81 N. E. r41.
"In Gonsolidated Gas Co. of New York v. City of New York (19o8) 126 App.
Div. 95o, in N. Y. Supp. 11i5, the judgment in the court below was affirmed
in a memorandum opinion, on the authority of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. City
of New York, discussed in the text. There is an interesting comment upon the
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. case, in Btisiness Men's Association of Ticonderoga v.
Delaware & H. Co. (i9o9, 2d Dept. of N. Y.) 2 Pub. Serv. Com. 78, 85.
' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago etc. Ry. (Ig9o) 218 U. S. 88,
30 Sup. Ct. 651; Pillage of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co. (i9o8) 19i N. Y. r23, 83 N. E. 693; Reeder, Validity of Rate Regula-
tions (7914) secs. 38-48.
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rates, and to the raising of rates as well as to the lowering of them. 0
One of the problems in connection with franchise rates has been the
extent of the power to raise such rates possessed by public service
commissions.
The much-cited case of Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Com-
mission,61 decided that there was no evidence of an intention to dele-
gate to the commission authority over franchise rates established in
pursuance of the provision of the New York constitution that street
railways may not be constructed or operated in municipalities except
with the consent of the local authorities. But in People ex rel. Village
of South Glens Falls v. Public Service Commission62 where the
franchise contract was with a gas company instead of a street rail-
way, it was held -that the commission had authority to raise the
franchise rates. The difference was in tthis, that the requirement that
gas companies shall get the consent of local authorities before entering
a municipality is statutory, while the similar provision with regard to
street railways is constitutional,63 Thus in New York the general
authority given to the public service commissions over rates is held
to give them authority to raise franchise rates, except when those
franchise rates are a condition of a consent which is required by the
constitution.
Courts of other states, having consent provisions with regard to
street railways in their constitutions similar to that in New York,
have not made the distinction made by the New York courts, but have
interpreted the power of the commissions over rates to include the
'Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Commission, supra; State ex rel. Mis-
souri Southern Ry. v. Public Service Commission (1914) 259 Mo. 704, 168 S. W.
1156; Robertson v. Wilmington & P. Traction Co. (1918, Del.) io4 Atl. 839.
1 Supra, two judges dissenting.
'2Supra, three judges dissenting.
'See the ground of the decision in the Quinby case as stated in International
Ry. v. Public Service Commission, supra. In that case it was held that where a
franchise contract with a street railway reserves the power of the legislature to
regulate fares, it will be inferred that the power to so regulate them was dele-
gated to the commission. In International Ry. v. Rann (1918) 224 N. Y. 83, it
was held that though a street railway enters a city under franchises fixing rates,
the commission may raise rates if the municipality consents. In Koehn v. Public
Service Commission (1919, N. Y.) 107 Misc. 151, the Supreme Court at special
term decided that the constitutional requirement that a street railway shall get
the consent of municipal authorities before entering the municipality, does not
give the municipality authority to contract as to rates to be charged outside of
the municipality. The court, by way of dictum, suggested that where a street
railway was permitted after the enactment of the public service commission law
to enter a city upon condition of agreeing to certain rates, the rates are subject
to the commission's power. This seems very doubtful. But if the rate contract
is not a term of the consent required by the state constitution, the Quinby case
does not apply, and the commission may raise the rates. Niagara Falls v. Public
Service Commission (igg) 177 N. Y. Supp. 861.
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power ,to raise franchise rates of street railways, as well as the franchise
rates of other utilities.6 4 Where the contract as to rates is made by
the municipality with the utility, as the result of legislative rather
than constitutional authority, there is substantial unanimity in the
conclusion that the commissions have authority to raise such rates,
unless a contrary intention is apparent.,5  The only discordant note
in this group of cases seems to be from Ohio, in Interurban Ry. &
Terminal Company v. Public Utilities Commission.6 6 There it was
held that, municipalities having by statute "the power to fix the terms
and conditions upon which such railways may be constructed, operated,
extended and consolidated," a franchise ordinance which is accepted,
embodying terms as to rates, is a contract, and that the general power
over rates vested in the commission did not give it power to raise
such franchise rates. The court in reaching this conclusion relied
upon the Quinby case, which we have seen has been interpreted as
standing for no such broad proposition.
Of course, however, the commission may by the clear intent of the
legislature be excluded from all control over franchise rates, as under
the Georgia statute defining the power of the commission, which
expressly provides that nothing therein shall be construed to impair
any valid, subsisting contract relations between any municipality and
company, or to repeal any ordinance.67
The recent economic crisis in public utility enterprises, which has
changed the general effort to reduce rates into a general effort to
raise them, has on the whole found the law sufficiently elasfic to meet
the new demands. There have only been occasional setbacks. Further-
more, the machinery of public utility commissions has fortunately been
in general operation. The crisis has again demonstrated how much
better fitted they are to deal with rate regulation than are the state
legislatures.
C, St. Louis v. Public Service Commission, supra; Kansas City v. Public Service
Commission, supra; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light Co. supra; Virginia-Western
Power Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Clifton Forge, supra. In City of Chicago
v. O'Connell, supra, the commission was held to have authority to change regu-
lations for running cars embodied in a franchise under a consent provision of
the state constitution.
'Portland v. Public Service Commission, supra; Sandpoint Water & Light
Co. v. City of Sandpoint, supra; Travers City v. Railroad Commission (918,
Mich.) 168 N. W. 481; State ex rel. City of Billings v. Billings Gas Co. (1918,
Mont.) 173 Pac. i99; State ex rel. Seattle v. Public Service Commission (19x8,
Wash.) 173 Pac. 737; Collingswood Sewerage Co. v. Collingswood, supra.
0Supra.
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra; and see Virginia-
Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Clifton Forge, supra.
